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ABSTRACT 
The highly anticipated finalized rule changes to the Small Business 
Administration 8(a) Business Development Program will have a prominent 
impact on 8(a) certified Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs). This Article 
evaluates the weaknesses in the previous regulations and analyzes how the 
revisions will effect ANC participation. The Article argues that the revisions 
address a number of ambiguities in the original regulations without limiting 
ANC participation in the 8(a) Business Development Program, but other 
factors may prove critical to future ANC contract procurement. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the Small Business Administration (SBA) finalized rule 
changes to how it implements section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.1 
These changes (2011 Revisions) took effect on March 14, 2011.2 The 2011 
Revisions respond to concerns about lack of clarity in the original 
regulations and criticisms of Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) 
participation in the business development program.3 The 2011 
Revisions’ stated goals include clarifying program guidelines to avoid 
confusion and addressing concerns of program benefit abuse.4 The 
 
* B.A., Hollins University, 2006; J.D., University at Buffalo Law School, 2009. The 
author is an attorney in Anchorage, Alaska, a law clerk to the Honorable John 
Suddock of the Alaska Superior Court, and a former law clerk to the judges of 
the Anchorage District Court. Many thanks to all family, friends, and colleagues 
for their encouragement throughout the writing and editing process. 
 1.  Small Business Size Regulations; 8(a) Business Development/Small 
Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8222 (Feb. 11, 
2011) [hereinafter 8(a) Business Development]. 
  2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
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following sections explore this topic with a focus on the changes as they 
relate to ANC participation in the SBA. Part I provides a brief history of 
ANCs and describes their integration into the 8(a) Business 
Development Program. Part II summarizes the criticisms of ANC 
participation in the program and outlines the ultimate objectives of the 
2011 Revisions. Finally, Part III examines how the finalized 2011 
Revisions and their rule changes will impact ANC participation in the 
8(a) Business Development Program. 
I. ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND SECTION 8(A) 
A.  A New Approach to Aboriginal Land Claims 
ANCs were created through the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act of 1971 (ANCSA) as an experiment. Rather than resort to the failing 
reservation system of the lower forty-eight states, ANCSA legislation 
established a corporate framework to govern the relationship between 
Alaska Natives and the United States government.5 ANCSA 
extinguished aboriginal land claims in Alaska to allow the State of 
Alaska and the federal government to obtain rights to the abundant oil 
and minerals found in the state. In exchange, Alaska Natives received 
$962 million6 and title to approximately forty-four million acres of land.7 
Most importantly, ANCSA gave Alaska Natives a business 
structure with which to administer these new land rights and create 
future profits for shareholders.8 ANCSA created twelve regional 
corporations within Alaska, each characterized by ancestral history and 
geography, and a thirteenth Regional Corporation for Alaska Natives 
living outside the state.9 ANCSA also established additional village 
corporations within the regional corporations’ geographic areas.10 
 
 5.  H.R. REP. NO. 92-746, at 8 (1971) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1971 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2247, 2253; see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h 
(2012)). 
 6.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), (3) (2012). 
 7.  See id. § 1613 (conveying land); see also James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: Delivering on the Promise, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. 1, 12–24 (2007). 
 8.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012). 
 9.  Id. § 1606. 
 10.  Id. § 1607. 
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Upon incorporation, the ANCs identified and distributed shares to 
a total of 79,044 Alaska Natives.11 ANC shares are inalienable; they 
cannot be issued or sold save for very limited circumstances among 
family members.12 Additionally, ANCSA exempts ANCs from the 
regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.13 These 
provisions ensure that ANC ownership remains with the population the 
ANC was created to serve, but they also limit the ANCs in their ability 
to raise capital quickly and compete in the general market. 
 
 
Geographical Designations of Alaska Native Regional Corporations.14 
B.  Strengthening Communities to Honor Native Values 
 Forty years after ANCSA, ANCs are major participants in Alaska’s 
economy. In 2008, when a widespread economic recession caused losses 
for businesses across the United States, ANCs experienced 17.5% overall 
 
 11.  NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, FACT SHEET: CALCULATING BENEFITS TO 
SHAREHOLDERS 1, available at http://www.Native8aworks.com/the_facts/docs/ 
EIG038%20Benefits%20Sholder%20Handout.pdf. 
 12.  43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1)(B)–(C). 
 13.  Id. § 1625(a). 
 14.  FRANK NORRIS, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., ALASKA 
SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT HISTORY Map 4-1 (2002), 
available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/norris1. 
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growth in revenues.15 By 2011, twenty-two of the top forty-nine 
businesses in Alaska were ANCs.16 Through steady development and 
profits, ANCs have become economic powerhouses within Alaska. 
Combined, ANCs provide 64% of Alaskan jobs and generate 74% of the 
state’s revenue.17 
 Business success gives ANCs the ability to serve as centers of their 
communities. Alaska Natives have close ties to the land and often live in 
extreme environments, in villages not connected to the road system, and 
far from creature comforts. Rural life can be difficult, limiting, and 
expensive, but many Alaska Natives consider it central to their 
heritage.18 Today a total of 112,686 regional and village corporation 
shareholders benefit from ANC profits.19 In 2008, ANCs distributed a 
total of $171 million, or 66% of total net profits, to shareholders in the 
form of dividends.20 
 In addition to paying annual dividends, ANCs provide unique 
benefits to shareholders such as subsidies for food, heat, insurance, and 
education.21 Shareholders are also eligible for preferential hiring within 
the corporations, scholarships, subsistence training, and youth camps.22 
In 2010, ANCs reported employing a total of 3,577 Alaska Natives, 
approximately 10% of the corporations’ total workforces. Moreover, they 
contributed $11 million to scholarships in 2008.23 These are just a few 
illustrations of ANCs’ positive impact on Alaska’s economy and Alaska 
Native communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 15.  ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, TRANSFORMATIONS: ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 
2010 ECONOMIC DATA 8 (2010), available at http://www.ciri.com/content/ 
history/documents/ANCSA_EconomicReport_2010.pdf. 
  16.  Id. at 9. 
 17.  Debbie Cutler, 2011 Alaska’s Top 49ers: Superheroes of Success, ALASKA 
BUS. MONTHLY, Oct. 2011, at 60, available at 
http://issuu.com/alaska_business_monthly/docs/october-2010. 
 18.  See generally Robert O’Harrow Jr., In Alaska, a Promise Unmet, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1. 
 19.   NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, supra note 11, at 1. 
 20.   ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, supra note 15, at 8. 
 21.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-399, INCREASED USE OF 
ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED 
OVERSIGHT 81–83 (2006). 
 22.  Id. at 83–84; see also Linxwiler, supra note 7, at 12–46. 
 23.  NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, supra note 11, at 2. 
MAASS.V22 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012 4:55 PM 
2012 ANCS AND 8(A) CONTRACTING 55 
C.  A Hand Up, Not a Hand Out 
 Alaska Native communities did not immediately realize the 
economic benefits of ANCs. In fact, the transition from subsistence and 
rural lifestyles to running Western corporate entities nearly destroyed 
several regional corporations within their first twenty years of 
incorporation.24 Since the mid-1980s, a substantial number of 
corporations have enjoyed success due in part to their participation in 
the SBA 8(a) Business Development Program (8(a) BD Program).25 
 The 8(a) BD Program is designed to assist socially and 
economically disadvantaged small business owners in becoming 
competitively viable.26 The program allows qualifying firms to procure 
government contracts on a sole-source, or non-competitive, basis.27 Once 
admitted, firms may participate for up to nine years before graduating 
from the program.28  
 The SBA arranges with each agency for 8(a) certified businesses to 
complete the set-aside contracts.29 The SBA uses a variety of methods to 
award contracts to a particular firm. The most common method is an 
inter-program competition, but the contracting federal agency or the 
SBA may also make a special selection for a particular contract.30 No 
matter how the SBA chooses a firm, the federal agency is prohibited 
from paying more than the fair market price for the work to be 
performed.31 The 8(a) BD Program provides a way for small businesses 
that lack the resources to procure bid-awarded government contracts to 
gain valuable business opportunities. For ANCs, 8(a) participation offers 
a special opportunity to increase revenues and, consequently, provide 
benefits to Alaska Native shareholders.32 
 
 24.  See Travis G. Buchanan, One Company, Two Worlds: The Case for Alaska 
Native Corporations, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 297, 303–04 & n.42 (2010); see also INST. OF 
SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, BENEFITS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND THE SBA 
8(A) BD PROGRAM TO ALASKA NATIVES AND ALASKA 8 (2009), available at 
iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/8(a)/Full_Report.pdf; Linxwiler, supra note 7, 
at 12–45. 
 25.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 6. 
 26.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8223 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
 27.  43 U.S.C. § 1626(e) (2012); see also 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2012) (“Sole source 
acquisition means a contract for the purchase of supplies or services that is 
entered into or proposed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting and 
negotiating with only one source.” (emphasis added)). 
 28.  13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2012). 
 29.  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 30.  Buchanan, supra note 24, at 303–04 & n.42. 
 31.  15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A). 
 32.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 80–84. 
MAASS.V22 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012 4:55 PM 
56 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 29:1 
 The core of the 8(a) BD Program is small business development. 
When program regulations were amended in 1986, ANCs were young 
corporations with widely varying levels of success. Individual ANCs 
and their subsidiaries were not necessarily prepared to single-handedly 
take on complex government contracts. Partnership agreements offered 
a solution. 
 SBA guidelines permit 8(a) firms to partner with non-8(a) firms in 
mentor-protégé relationships to seek guidance and support. When 
necessary or desirable, an 8(a) firm can even enter into a joint venture 
agreement with one or more non-8(a) firms to work together for a 
limited duration on a specific contract.33 By forming partnerships within 
the 8(a) BD Program, ANC subsidiaries can offer a broad range of 
services and complete complex government contracts.34 This facilitates 
business growth and skill development for future expansion without 
reliance on government intervention.35 
D.  Special Rights for Native-Owned Businesses 
 Congress used ANCSA as the foundation to amend the 8(a) BD 
Program to specifically include ANCs.36 The amendments accounted for 
the unique government-to-government relationship between the federal 
government and Alaska Natives by exempting ANCs from certain 
program limitations.37 Typically, individual owners of the 
approximately 9,000 participating small businesses must qualify for 8(a) 
certification by proving their socially or economically disadvantaged 
status.38 But ANCSA automatically grants ANCs this status.39 Also, SBA 
guidelines typically limit 8(a) BD Program participants to one 8(a) 
 
 33.  Id. at 30. 
 34.  Id. at 6–7. 
 35.  Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., SBA Issues Final Rules on 8(a) Ushers 
in New Generation for Successful Program (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://nana-dev.com/news_and_press/news_archive/ 
sba_issues_final_rules_on_8_a__ushers_in_new_gen. 
 36.  See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)(A)(i)(II); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012) 
(creating a rebuttable presumption that Alaska Natives are socially 
disadvantaged). 
 37.  ACQUISITION AND GRANTS OFFICE, NAT’L OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
UNIQUE RIGHTS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATION OWNED 8(A) BUSINESSES IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS 3 (1996), available at 
http://www.ago.noaa.gov/ago/acquisition/docs/alaska_native_contracting.p
df. 
 38.  15 U.S.C. § 637 (a)(1)(B), (a)(4). 
 39.  43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(2) (2012). 
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certified firm in a lifetime.40 ANCs have no such limit, essentially 
allowing parent ANCs to establish multiple subsidiaries for 8(a) 
certification, provided that each subsidiary operates within a different 
primary industry.41 Additionally, most 8(a) firms are limited by 
“competitive thresholds” of $4 million for service contracts and $6.5 
million for manufacturing contracts. These thresholds do not apply to 
tribally-owned firms, allowing ANCs to receive sole-source government 
contracts regardless of the dollar amount.42 
E.  A Foundation for Success 
 In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 
twelve of the thirteen regional corporations, thirty-three village 
corporations, and four urban corporations had subsidiaries participating 
in the 8(a) BD Program.43 This meant big business for participating 
ANCs, Alaska Natives, and the Alaskan economy. From 2000 to 2004, 
ANCs procured a total of $2.9 billion in government contract 
obligations.44 During those years, 77% of 8(a) contracts procured by 
ANCs were awarded on a sole-source basis.45 
 Today, government contracts, both within and outside of the 8(a) 
BD Program, account for the majority of ANC revenues.46 In 2010, 
Sealaska Corporation (Sealaska) attributed just over half of its revenues 
to government services.47 Meanwhile, Bering Straits Regional 
Corporation attributed 94% of its 2010 revenues to government 
services.48 Also in 2010, Ahtna Regional Corporation earned 70% of its 
$243 million in revenues from government services while Aleut 
Management Services attributed 80% of its revenues to government 
services.49 Both of these regional corporations report that the 8(a) BD 
 
 40.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2012); 48 C.F.R. § 19.805-1(a)–(b). 
 43.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 78–79. 
  44.  Id. at 6. 
 45.  Id. 
  46.  Julie Stricker, 2010 ANCSA Regional Corporation Overview, ALASKA BUS. 
MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2011, at 72, available at http://issuu.com/ 
alaska_business_monthly/docs/september_2011?mode=window&viewMode=d
oublePage. 
 47.  Id. at 81. 
  48.   Id. at 74. 
  49.  Id. at 73. 
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Program has been key to growth and success but that the time has come 
to diversify and endeavor toward competitive contracts.50 
 Only a handful of ANCs are not heavily reliant on government 
contracts for significant portions of their annual revenues. In most cases, 
ANCs that flourish without government contracts have diverse business 
holdings and rights to lands that are rich in natural resources. Bristol 
Bay Native Corporation and Cook Inlet Regional, Inc. (CIRI) both 
maintain substantial business interests outside of the 8(a) BD Program 
and have landholdings rich in natural resources.51 North Slope-based 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) holds title to five million 
acres of highly mineralized land and paid staggering dividends of 
$51.83 per share in 2010.52 Calista Regional Corporation subsidiaries 
Yulista and Tunista Arctic Rim are both 8(a) BD Program graduates that 
recently began acquiring non-ANC Alaska businesses.53 
 Similarly, Doyon, Ltd. has varied its business interests among four 
“pillars.”54 Doyon typically attributed the bulk of its profits to oilfield 
services, but the government contracting pillar took the lead in 2010, 
accounting for roughly two-thirds of Doyon’s revenues.55 Additionally, 
Doyon, the largest private landowner in Alaska, reports that it is 
exploring its landholdings for gold, zinc, lead, and copper. This 
diversified and steady growth indicates that Doyon does not require 8(a) 
government contracts to survive.56 
 The contrast between ANCs that attribute substantial portions of 
revenues to government services and those that thrive without these 
valuable contracts indicates that some ANCs need the 8(a) BD Program 
more than others. The key variable in this difference is usually whether 
a given ANC has rights to lands with abundant and accessible natural 
resources. Clearly the 8(a) BD Program provides the benefits it promises 
to those ANCs that choose to participate. But for those more dependent 
on government contracts for income, certain revisions could lead to 
financial instability in the coming years. 
 
 
 
 50.  Id. at 73–74. 
 51.  Id. at 75, 78. 
 52.  Id. at 72–73. 
 53.  Id. at 76–77. 
  54.  Id. at 78. 
  55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. (identifying Doyon’s four “pillars” as oilfield services, government 
contracting, natural resource development, and transitional). 
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II. CALLS FOR CHANGE FROM “OUTSIDE”  
 The majority of scrutiny over ANC participation in the 8(a) BD 
Program came from sources outside Alaska. These critics cited a broad 
spectrum of issues pertaining to continued procurement of sole-source 
contracts by ANCs. Primary concerns included whether program 
benefits reach shareholders,57 ANCs obtaining a large percentage of 8(a) 
contracts,58 regional corporations exceeding small business size 
limitations, and ANC practices of hiring non-Native managers and 
subcontracting work to non-8(a) firms.59 The sum of these concerns was 
the view that ANCs are not minority-operated businesses, thereby 
depriving shareholders of the expected benefits from increased access to 
government contracts.60  
 Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) and House Representative 
Bennie Thompson (D-Mississippi), both harsh critics of ANCs, fueled 
this criticism.61 Rather than call for revision or compromise, Senator 
McCaskill and Representative Thompson each introduced bills in early 
2011 to remove all preferential status for ANCs under the 8(a) BD 
Program.62 Moreover, they proposed eliminating the automatic 
designation of economically and socially disadvantaged status for 
ANCs, an action that would effectively be a legislative violation of 
ANCSA.63 But their criticisms were based on incomplete reports, a lack 
 
 57.  Robert O’Harrow, Behind Lucrative Deals, A Disconnect, WASH. POST, Oct. 
1, 2010, at A1. 
 58.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 12. 
 59.  Id.; U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS SUBCOMM. 
ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CONTRACTING 
PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS (PART II) 12, 16 (2009) 
[hereinafter U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.], available at 
http://mccaskill.senate.gov/pdf/071509/ANC.pdf. 
 60.  Elise Castelli, Alaska Contracts Alarm Critics, FED. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2009, 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20090720/ACQUISITION03/907200301/
1024/DEPARTMENTS05; O’Harrow, supra note 18. 
 61.  Hearing on Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security, 
111 Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of Sen. McCaskill, Member, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security). 
 62.  Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
Press Ctr., Thompson Calls for Elimination of the Alaskan Native Corporation 
Carve-Out (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/press/ 
index.asp?ID=613. 
 63.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8233–8234, (Feb. 11, 2011); see 
also S. 3959, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 598, 111th Cong. (2010). The proposition to 
extinguish ANCs’ automatic designation as socially and economically 
disadvantaged violates the ANCSA provision that reads: “For all purposes of 
Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be a corporation owned 
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of compiled data, and overarching calls for increased oversight in 
government contracting programs.64 With only a partial view of the 
situation, critics failed to account for essential variables in their analyses 
of ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program. 
 The purpose and function of 8(a) participation is far more complex 
for ANCs than for their non-Native counterparts. In addition to building 
viable businesses, ANCs are charged with providing economic, social, 
and cultural benefits to their shareholders.65 ANCs are diverse in terms 
of size, culture, and the communities they represent, and they use their 
profits differently to meet their respective needs.66 As such, a simple 
comparison between ANC and non-ANC 8(a) activities does not tell the 
whole story. 
 Alaska Senators Lisa Murkowski and Mark Begich defended ANCs 
against these charges, but they recognized that reforms may be in 
order.67 Moreover, in response to the proposed bills, leaders from ASRC, 
Doyon, and CIRI—three of the largest ANCs, together representing over 
35,000 shareholders—issued a joint statement calling for radical changes 
to 8(a) BD Program regulations.68 Some of the changes for which these 
 
and controlled by Natives and a minority and economically disadvantaged 
business enterprise. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2012). 
 64.  In 2010 the Alaska Law Review published a note that examined and 
identified the weaknesses in these criticisms and argued for a holistic view of 
ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program. See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 315 
n.98. 
 65.  See generally ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, supra note 15. 
 66.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, Legislative Dir., Native Am. 
Contractors Assoc. (Nov. 10, 2011). 
 67.  Sean Cockerham, Alaska Delegation Wary of Native Contracting 
Investigation: Hearing Could Be “Showboat” Politics, Begich Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.adn.com/2011/10/05/2106314/alaska-
delegation-wary-of-probe.html (“Instead of a showboat political hearing, what’s 
needed is proper oversight from the federal government to prevent activities like 
[the EyakTek GTSI incident] in the future and Sen. Begich is working toward 
that goal.”); Rhoda McBride, Senate Candidates Address Alaska Native Issues at 
Forum, KTUU (Oct. 7, 2010), http://articles.ktuu.com/2010-10-07/alaska-
Natives_24130067 (“‘We must stand behind these programs that allow for 
opportunity for our Alaska Natives,’ Murkowski said. Murkowski did say that 
her support was not unconditional, and that Native corporations need to be held 
accountable when managing government contracts.”). 
 68.  These ANCs cite building sustainable businesses and reducing repeated 
violations for proposing these revisions: “Our proposed reforms are intended to 
build on the successes of the 8(a) program by promoting more competition, 
strengthening enforcement against those who repeatedly violate the rules of the 
program and requiring Native 8(a) companies to track and report benefits 
derived from their 8(a) contracts.” Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 
Strengthening the 8(a) BD program (Sept. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.asrc.com/CorpNews/Pages/News-3.aspx. 
MAASS.V22 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2012 4:55 PM 
2012 ANCS AND 8(A) CONTRACTING 61 
ANCs advocated included tracking and reporting shareholder benefits, 
requiring specific justification for sole-source awards exceeding $100 
million, and increasing enforcement of existing SBA regulations.69 
 With ANC participants cooperating, the SBA began to review its 
8(a) guidelines. For twenty-five years, the SBA and 8(a) participants had 
observed how ANCs function within the program. Through continued 
program participation, interested parties—ANC supporters and critics—
identified certain provisions in the original guidelines that create 
challenges for 8(a) certified firms. Though this debate subjected ANCs to 
harsh, and often unfair, criticism, the dialogue proved to be timely in 
promoting a review of 8(a) guidelines.70 
III. ANSWERS TO CALLS FOR REFORM 
 Prior to publishing its final revisions, the SBA reviewed comments 
submitted by interested parties and conducted a series of tribal 
consultations, including some with ANC leaders.71 The updated 
program regulations are comprehensive and applicable to all 8(a) 
certified firms.72 But some revisions are more significant to Native-
owned firms, particularly ANCs, than others. The most pertinent 
revisions for ANC participation include new regulations for SBA 
oversight, clearer subsidiary and industry code guidelines, stricter rules 
for the mentor-protégé program, and clarified requirements for 8(a) joint 
ventures.73 
A.  Transparency to the SBA, Deference to ANCs 
 Those suspicious of ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program 
suggested that Alaska Native communities do not receive sufficient 
program benefits from sole-source government contracts procured by 
their respective ANCs. Pre-revision ANCSA required that ANCs 
provide shareholders with annual reports of corporate activities,74 but 
insufficient compiled data makes this accusation difficult to summarily 
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Government agencies periodically review program regulations. This 
was the first series of comprehensive revisions in over ten years. 8(a) Business 
Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8222 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 73.  Revised 8(a) Business Development Program Regulations Fact Sheet, U.S. 
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/revised-8a-business-
development-program-regulations-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 74.  43 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2012). 
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disprove.75 After the 2011 Revisions, the SBA now requires ANCs, 
Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations participating in the 
8(a) BD Program to communicate certain activities directly to the SBA. 
The purpose of this new regulation is to ensure that the corporation is 
not making business choices that are detrimental to the community.76 
Additional revisions provide the SBA with recourse when participants 
act in violation of these regulations. 
1. Reporting Community Benefits 
 The distinct lack of government data about ANC 8(a) participation 
causes outsiders to assume the worst of ANCs: that the communities 
they are tasked with serving gain little from 8(a) BD Program 
participation. The deficiency in data is directly linked to insufficient SBA 
resources, which consequently results in minimal oversight. In 2008, the 
Anchorage SBA office, which is charged with monitoring 8(a) contracts 
in Alaska and ANC subsidiary activities, had only three staff members 
to oversee more than 200 ANC firms.77 Looking forward, the San 
Francisco and Philadelphia regional offices will play a much larger role 
in fulfilling the tasks previously assigned to the Anchorage office in an 
attempt to increase the flow of information to the agency.78 
 In a more precise attempt to acquire data, a new regulation 
stipulates that ANCs, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations 
must annually report the financial benefits of the 8(a) BD Program 
flowing back to their communities. ANC regional corporations will 
submit one report on behalf of all their subsidiaries.79 ANCs’ responses 
to this revision have been positive. In fact, the new reporting 
requirement is similar to a revision suggested by ASRC, CIRI and 
Doyon.80 The requirement will give ANCs the chance to display their 
success and disprove the recent allegations of abuse, fraud, and waste 
by highlighting the wide array of benefits provided to shareholders.81 
 Though annual reporting is nothing new to ANCs, compliance will 
require more than simply passing this information along to the SBA. 
Native communities across the United States expressed concern that the 
federal government will impose its generic view of acceptable 
 
 75.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 39. 
 76.  Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35. 
 77.  Castelli, supra note 60. 
 78.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8238 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
 79.  Id. at 8248 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.604 (2012)). 
 80.  Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., supra note 68. 
 81.  Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35; Telephone Interview 
with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
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community benefits without having the ability to distinguish between 
the needs of each community.82 Alaska Native communities vary widely 
in cultural and community needs, just as their respective Native 
corporations vary in size and complexity. Consequently, the best 
methods to meet the unique needs of each community vary widely. One 
ANC might best serve its shareholders entirely through direct dividend 
payments while another might choose to use some profits to provide a 
variety of community services. Though the SBA takes a broader 
approach to recognizing benefits to Native communities, it remains to be 
seen how indirect benefits, such as reinvesting profits in the corporation, 
will be viewed by the federal government overall.83 
 The difficulties with this proposed reporting scheme and the 2011 
Revisions’ incomplete language creating these defects is reminiscent of 
the same problems the new regulation attempts to remedy. In response, 
the SBA delayed implementation of the reporting requirement for six 
months to find a practical solution with input from Native 8(a) 
participants.84 In June 2011, the Native American Contractors 
Association presented the SBA with a model reporting form designed to 
account for the diverse Native firms and their communities. The SBA 
has not published its final decision on the reporting method, but it 
continues to communicate with Native-owned participants in the 
interim.85 
2.  Clarifying Excessive Withdrawals 
 In business vernacular, “withdrawals” typically include officer 
salaries, bonuses, advances, loans, individual investments, and 
speculative ventures.86 Although the 8(a) BD Program always prohibited 
excessive withdrawals, the SBA previously had little to no means of 
enforcing this limitation.87 The 2011 Revisions provide recourse for 
excessive withdrawal violations. The SBA may terminate or “early 
graduate” firms from the 8(a) BD Program for making withdrawals that 
are detrimental to the achievement of program targets, objectives, and 
goals.88 To modernize the regulation to contemporary financial 
standards, the SBA also increased the thresholds of what withdrawals 
 
 82.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236. 
 85.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 86.  13 C.F.R. § 124.112(d) (2012). 
 87.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8326. 
 88.  Id. at 8239 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(13)). 
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would be considered “excessive” by $100,000.89 For ANCs, which 
typically have annual sales in excess of $2 million, a withdrawal for the 
benefit of an individual within the firm may be deemed “excessive” if it 
exceeds $400,000.90 
 ANCSA requires that ANC boards of directors consist of 
shareholders, meaning Alaska Natives, but no such requirements exist 
for filling officer positions.91 Based on the previous definition of 
“withdrawals,” it would seem that ANCs are now limited to paying 
executives and consultants $400,000 per year for their contributions to 
government contracts procured through the 8(a) BD Program. 
 But, the 2011 Revisions also changed the definition of the term 
“withdrawal” to no longer include officer salaries.92 According to the 
SBA, this allows 8(a) firms to recruit and retain key employees by 
offering competitive salaries.93 For ANCs this means that officer salaries 
are not limited by the new excessive withdrawal thresholds, regardless 
of whether a shareholder holds the position.94 The SBA yields to ANC 
judgment even further by excluding tribally owned firms from the 
excessive withdrawal prohibition.95 Instead, only excessive withdrawals 
made for the personal benefit of a non-Native manager are open to SBA 
scrutiny.96 The SBA asserts its interest in ensuring that financial benefits 
reach Alaska Native shareholders, but it defers to ANC leadership to 
determine the best investments in future officers and business 
ventures.97 
B.  Reaching and Re-identifying Industry Goals 
 Under the original 8(a) BD Program guidelines, if an 8(a) firm met 
its “targets, objectives, and goals,” the SBA had the discretion to force 
the firm into “early graduation” prior to the expiration of its nine-year 
tenure.98 But, because goals can change due to unanticipated market 
shifts, a better measurement of success may be growth. In either case, 
 
 89.  Id. at 8237 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(13)). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(f) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 21, at 3. 
 92.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Some critics objected to 8(a) certified ANCs hiring non-Natives for high 
salary executive and consultant positions. See supra note 59. 
 95.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 8236–37. 
 98.  13 C.F.R. § 124.302 (2012). 
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the 8(a) firm would have achieved its program goals so that continued 
participation would no longer be necessary. 
 The 8(a) BD Program identifies small businesses depending on the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code within 
which the small business operates.99 When a business applies for 8(a) 
certification, it must qualify as “small” according to its primary NAICS 
code.100 ANCs must meet the same size standards as all other participant 
firms to qualify for 8(a) certification, but subsidiaries are assessed apart 
from the ANC parent corporation.101 If an 8(a) certified firm outgrows 
the limits for its NAICS code, it is technically ineligible for the 8(a) BD 
Program. Under the original guidelines, however, this restriction was 
not enforceable in practice. Instead, the SBA reserved the “early 
graduation” option for firms that met their “targets, objectives and 
goals.”102 Moreover, growing beyond “small business” status was not 
recognized as a universal objective under the previous 8(a) guidelines. 
The 2011 Revisions require 8(a) certified firms to remain “small” 
according to their primary NAICS codes throughout their nine years in 
the 8(a) BD Program.103 If a firm exceeds its size limit for three 
successive years, the SBA has the discretion to “early graduate” the firm 
just as if it had reached its program “targets, objectives and goals.”104 
 Previously, the 8(a) regulations barred participant firms from 
changing to a different primary NAICS code, even if the majority of 
their revenues came from work performed under secondary industry 
codes.105 The 2011 Revisions now allow a firm to switch primary NAICS 
codes if the majority of its revenues have evolved from the former code 
to a new code over a two-year period.106 This option is also available 
 
 99.  See North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (last revised Jan. 11, 2012) (“The 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by 
Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the 
purposes of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the 
U.S. business economy.”). 
 100.  13 C.F.R. § 124.102(a)(2). 
 101.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 26–27. 
 102.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8227. 
 103.  Id. at 8228 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.102(a)(2)). 
 104.  Id. at 8228–29 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.302(c)). 
 105.  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.3 (2010) (“Primary industry classification means the 
four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code designation which best 
describes the primary business activity of the 8(a) BD applicant or Participant. 
The SIC code designations are described in the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual Published by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.”). 
 106.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8227 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 
124.3 (2012)). 
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retrospectively. An 8(a) participant facing early graduation can remain 
in the program if it demonstrates an attempt to change its industry focus 
to a secondary NAICS code. The secondary NAICS code must have a 
larger size limitation to justify the increase, and any plans to shift 
NAICS codes must be contained in the firm’s most recently approved 
business plan.107 Allowing firms to switch primary NAICS codes in the 
midst of program participation will likely prove vital to thorough 
program oversight and allow firms to complete their nine years of 
program eligibility. 
 Another significant change involving NAICS industry codes 
pertains to the timing for ANCs to create new subsidiaries for 8(a) 
contract procurement. In general terms, ANCs can create unlimited 
subsidiaries to participate in the 8(a) BD Program. For ANC parent 
companies, the original regulations only required that the company not 
have more than one subsidiary operating within a given NAICS code on 
a primary basis. For subsidiaries, the original regulations only required 
that the subsidiary conduct business within its primary NAICS code for 
two years before applying for 8(a) certification.108 No regulations 
prohibited ANC parent companies from replacing subsidiaries facing 
program graduation through other means. In an effort to continue 
procuring contracts within a desirable industry, ANC parent companies 
had the option to certify new subsidiaries under the same NAICS code 
on a secondary basis.109 The new subsidiary would overlap with its 
predecessor in every way, sometimes even rehiring the same employees 
and continuing to procure contracts from the same government 
agencies.110 
 If an ANC formed a partnership with a non-8(a) corporation, that 
partnership was free to establish multiple subsidiaries and partnerships 
through which to participate in the 8(a) BD Program. For example, if 
such an ANC and its partner were to establish a joint venture called JV I, 
two years later it could then establish another joint venture, JV II, 
operating under the same NAICS code on a secondary basis. The 
partnership would procure sole-source government contracts through 
JV I for nine years. Upon the graduation of JV I, the partnership would 
then use JV II to continue to procure contracts within that coveted 
NAICS code. 
 
 107.  13 C.F.R. § 124.112(e). 
 108.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 109.  13 C.F.R. 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2010). 
 110.  See 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234. 
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 In 2006, the GAO identified an ANC with seven subsidiaries, six of 
which marketed capabilities within the NAICS code for “facilities 
support services” at various levels of priority.111 Instances such as this 
raised concerns regarding the possibility and likelihood that ANCs 
would rotate subsidiaries within various NAICS codes indefinitely.112 
Now, under the 2011 Revisions, when a subsidiary graduates from the 
program, two years must pass before the parent corporation can 
establish a new subsidiary in the same NAICS code and take on 8(a) BD 
Program government contracts.113 Further, ANCs and other tribally-
owned subsidiaries cannot procure follow-on contracts to 8(a) contracts 
previously performed by a subsidiary of the same parent corporation.114 
 This particular regulatory revision will have a clear impact on 
ANCs, all of which have a history of creating subsidiaries for 8(a) BD 
Program participation.115 Consequently, ANCs will have to adjust their 
business plans to obtain certain types of government contracts and 
consider expanding future subsidiaries into new industries. 
 This regulation levels the playing field for all 8(a) firms with 
interests in the same industry and encourages ANC subsidiaries to enter 
new areas of business. As noted above, Calista subsidiaries Yulista and 
Tunista Arctic Rim both graduated from the 8(a) BD Program after nine-
year tenures. As of 2011, both subsidiaries remain in business, forming 
partnerships and taking on competitive contracts without 8(a) BD 
Program benefits.116 Sealaska subsidiary SES Solutions offers another 
success story. After graduating from the 8(a) BD Program, SES Solutions 
now competes for contracts and independently forms joint ventures.117 
Clearly program graduation does not spell the demise of these 
subsidiaries, but rather promotes the true spirit of the 8(a) BD program: 
helping socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses to 
 
 111.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 85. 
 112.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234. 
 113.  Id. at 8227. 
 114.  Id. at 8234 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2012)). 
 115.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 34. 
 116.  Stricker, supra note 46, at 77. 
 117.  See, e.g., Sealaska Subsidiary Wins D.O.E. Contract, SEALASKA, 
http://www.sealaska.com/object/io_1218675306322.html (last visited Feb. 18, 
2012) (“SES is the managing partner in a small business joint venture with Tetra 
Tech EC, Inc., a New Jersey based international environmental remediation 
company, called SES-TECH Global Solutions. The JV team will share in the $700 
million contract ceiling over the next seven years with two other contract 
winners.”). 
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develop in order to fully participate in the economy without 
government support.118 
C.  Mentor-Protégé Relationships 
 The SBA established the mentor-protégé program to encourage 
non-8(a) firms to provide technical, financial, and other assistance to 8(a) 
BD Program participants in the course of contract performance. These 
partnerships give 8(a) firms access to capital, create new subsidiaries, 
form joint ventures, or otherwise allow 8(a) firms to obtain a better 
position when seeking contracts.119 In exchange, the mentor firm may 
perform work on 8(a) government contracts via an “exclusion from 
affiliation” of the small business size limitations.120 In 2006, 
approximately twenty-four ANC subsidiaries participated in the 
mentor-protégé program.121 Prior to the 2011 Revisions, federal agencies 
were often unclear as to which business relationships qualified as 
partnerships.122 
 The program charges mentor firms with a duty to provide their 
protégés with actual, substantive business development assistance.123 
But this regulation was not strictly enforced.124 Previously, mentor-
protégé agreements needed only to describe the assistance provided by 
the mentor.125 The new rules stipulate that the mentor must specifically 
address how it will assist its protégé in meeting the goals described in its 
business plan.126 In another effort by the SBA to avoid the exploitation of 
8(a) BD Program participants, mentor firms that fail to provide protégé 
firms with sufficient assistance will face stop-work orders or debarment 
from program participation.127 This revision provides protégés and the 
SBA peace of mind that mentor firms will fulfill their duties rather than 
use protégés as a front for access to sole-source contracts. 
 To further promote the mentor-protégé option, after the 2011 
Revisions the SBA now permits interested businesses to form multiple 
mentor-protégé relationships. Mentor firms may have up to three 
 
 118.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234. 
 119.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 29–30. 
 120.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223. 
 121.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 30. 
 122.  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.520 (2012). 
 123.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223. 
 124.  Id. at 8246–47. 
 125.  13 C.F.R. § 124.520(e)(1) (2010). 
 126.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8244 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 
124.520(e)(1)(i) (2012)). 
 127.  Id. at 8247 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(h)). 
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protégés if the protégé firms are not in direct competition with one 
another.128 Additionally, protégés with operations in multiple lines of 
business can obtain a second mentor.129 The second mentorship cannot 
conflict with the first, and the mentorship must refer to an unrelated, 
secondary NAICS code within which the first mentor cannot provide 
expertise.130 The SBA also clarified that 8(a) firms scheduled to graduate 
within six months are not eligible for protégé status,131 nor are firms 
currently serving as mentors.132 Also, once a firm reaches the end of its 
mentor-protégé agreement or exits the 8(a) BD Program, it is no longer 
eligible to benefit from that relationship.133 
 The SBA increased its oversight of the mentor-protégé program to 
ensure that 8(a) participants receive the appropriate benefits from these 
relationships. Mentors of ANC firms can no longer merely buttress the 
subsidiary’s fulfillment of contracts. Instead, mentors will have to 
account for the actual developmental support provided to their protégés 
throughout the partnership.134 In addition, the revision allowing a 
second mentor for ANCs operating within multiple NAICS codes serves 
a dual purpose. The provision gives ANCs greater growth opportunities 
and forces each ANC to splice its business practices officially, thus 
allowing for increased oversight. The number of 8(a) firms forming 
mentor-protégé partnerships is not likely to decrease in the future as a 
result of these revisions. Instead, more partnerships will form, albeit 
under closer supervision and complying with more administrative 
requirements. 
D.  Joint Venture Partnerships 
 For the purposes of the 8(a) BD Program, a joint venture is the 
incorporation of a mentor-protégé relationship. The SBA will only 
permit a joint venture agreement if the 8(a) participant lacks the 
necessary capacity to perform the contract outside a partnership.135 The 
SBA must find that the agreement is fair and equitable and will “be of 
substantial benefit to the 8(a) [participant].” If the SBA finds that an 8(a) 
 
 128.  Id. at 8244 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(b)(2)). 
 129.  Id. at 8245 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(3)). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 8246 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(5)). 
 132.  13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(4). 
 133.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8245 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 
124.520(d)(1)(iii)). 
 134.  13 C.F.R. § 124.520(h). 
 135.  Id. §124.513(a)(2). 
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participant brings very little to the joint venture aside from 8(a) status, 
the SBA will not approve that joint venture for contract procurement.136 
 Participation in 8(a) joint ventures is widespread among ANCs. In 
2006, the GAO interviewed twenty-six ANCs participating in the 8(a) 
subsidiary program. Among those interviewed, twenty-two owned 
subsidiaries with a total of fifty-seven joint venture agreements.137 For 
example, Bering Straits subsidiary Bering Straits Solutions joined forces 
with a California-based federal systems integration company to form 
Iteq/Bering Straits Solutions.138 Also, Sealaska partnered with a global 
leader in plastics design to form the joint venture Nypro Kánaak in 
order to obtain 8(a) contracts for plastics manufacturing.139 These 
business relationships give ANCs the opportunity to attempt greater 
business challenges and provide economic opportunities to which they 
would not normally have access. Furthermore, joint ventures promote 
business competition, develop shareholder skills, and provide good 
value for taxpayers within the 8(a) BD Program.140 
 Depending on its business strategy and goals, the recent revisions 
could significantly alter the future of a given joint venture. The revisions 
most likely to impact ANC joint venture partners include clarified 
contract management and work performance requirements, new 
regulations limiting subcontracting to non-8(a) partners, and expanded 
contract procurement limits. 
1.  Managerial Experience 
 Project management is a key aspect of 8(a) BD Program joint 
ventures. The managing firm gains significant practical experience and 
maintains control over the outcome of the project. But the old 8(a) BD 
Program guidelines were previously silent as to whether an 8(a) partner 
should manage its joint venture. The 2011 Revisions now dictate that the 
8(a) firm must play a managerial role in the joint venture.141 For an 
“unpopulated” joint venture, this means that an employee of the 8(a) 
partner, in this case the ANC subsidiary, must serve as project 
 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 30. 
 138.  SBA Profile for ITEQ/Bering Straits Solutions, SMALL BUS. ASS’N 
DYNAMIC SMALL BUS. SEARCH, http://dsbs.sba.gov/dsbs/search/ 
dsp_profile.cfm?User_Id=P0609519 (last updated Nov. 23, 2011). 
 139.  Government Contracting, NYPRO KANAAK, 
http://www.nyprokanaak.com/page/governmentcontracting (last visited Feb. 
18, 2012). 
 140.  Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35. 
  141.  13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(2). 
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manager.142 When a joint venture is “populated,” the joint venture must 
demonstrate to the SBA that an 8(a) partner controls performance of the 
contract.143 
 Directing 8(a) BD Program participants to take control of their 
business development is one of the more decisive revisions made by the 
SBA. Due to the previous lack of regulations pertaining to management 
requirements, very little published information exists indicating how 
often ANC subsidiaries take the lead in joint venture contracts. Indeed, 
in certain circumstances it seems illogical that a joint venture would 
choose to name the ANC subsidiary partner as “project manager.” For 
example, ESS Support Services regularly partners with Native 
corporations of various sizes. One of its largest 8(a) partners is Chiulista 
Services, a subsidiary of ANC powerhouse Calista. But ESS Support 
Services also regularly partners with small village corporations like 
Tikigaq, Kake, Gana-A’Yoo, and Kijic.144 As ESS is a division of the 
global corporation Compass Group,145 it is unlikely that the various 
small ANC partner firms would take the lead on each joint venture with 
ESS Solutions unless prompted by government regulations. 
 Moreover, some partnerships fail to fit into a particular mold. The 
joint venture Bering Straits Orion Management lists two managing 
partners, one from Bering Straits and one from the much larger firm 
Orion Management. In this case, the non-ANC partner firm is veteran-
owned and therefore also qualified to receive sole-source contracts 
through SBA programs.146 Until the 2011 Revisions, the SBA has not 
required specification of such tasks. But now the joint venture must 
demonstrate that the 8(a) partner acts as the project manager or risk 
program disqualification. Because this is an entirely new requirement, 
this revision will substantially impact how joint ventures are structured 
and represent themselves to the public.147 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Our Business Partners, ESS SUPPORT SERVICES, 
http://www.essalaska.com/partners.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  The Veteran Benefit Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 657(f) (2012). 
 147.  The Washington Post published an exposé on joint ventures between 
mentor firm GTSI and Eyak Corp. and a separate joint venture with one of Eyak 
Corp.’s direct competitors. The SBA suspected that GTSI was exploiting its 
protégé 8(a) partners’ small business status when staff members identified 
themselves to customers as GTSI rather than the joint venture. Letter from Tom 
Kennedy, Vice President, GTSI, to Multimax/Array GTSI JV Staff (Jul. 22, 2008), 
cited in O’Harrow, supra note 57. 
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2.  Documenting Joint Venture Contract Performance 
 Work performance minimums for 8(a) joint venture partners are 
not new to the 8(a) BD Program.148 But, the prior regulations were 
minimally enforced and were often only slightly understood by 
program participants. Previously, the regulations mandated that the 8(a) 
joint venture partner perform a “significant portion” of the work 
required to complete an awarded contract.149 However, the term 
“significant portion” was not defined. Additionally, no provisions 
outlined different functional reporting requirements depending on 
whether a joint venture was “populated” with its own employees, or 
“unpopulated,” using the partners’ respective employees to perform 
various parts of the contract. 
 Following major changes, the 2011 Revisions require the 8(a) 
participant in “unpopulated” joint ventures to perform at least 40% of 
all work done by the joint venture partners, excluding merely 
administrative tasks. The non-8(a) partner and its affiliates cannot serve 
as subcontractors to the project. Instead, any work performed by the 
non-8(a) partner or its affiliates must not account for more than 60% of 
all work performed by the joint venture partners. Meanwhile, the 8(a) 
partner can perform work directly or as a subcontractor to the project.150 
According to the SBA, each partnership must determine whether to 
form an “unpopulated” or “populated” joint venture.151 But 
“populated” joint ventures are subject to stricter regulations under the 
finalized 2011 Revisions. The 8(a) partner seeking approval for a 
“populated” joint venture must now demonstrate how it will benefit or 
develop its business through the relationship.152 Also, because 
employees of “populated” joint ventures work directly for the joint 
venture, it is impossible to determine which firm is performing the bulk 
of the work. For this reason, specific work requirements for 8(a) partners 
to “populated” joint ventures are ineffectual. Instead, the partnership 
must demonstrate that the 8(a) partner (1) controls the joint venture, (2) 
is responsible for its records, (3) owns at least 50% of the joint venture, 
and (4) receives profits commensurate with its ownership.153 
 
 148.  See 13 C.F.R. § 124.510 (2010) (“To assist the business development of 
Participants in the 8(a) BD program, an 8(a) contractor must perform certain 
percentages of work with its own employees.”). 
 149.  13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (2010). 
 150.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8224–25 (codified at 13 C.F.R. 
§ 124.513(d) (2012)). 
 151.  Id. at 8224. 
 152.  Id. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)(1)). 
 153.  Id. at 8224 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)). 
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3.  Subcontracting Work and Maintaining Profit Margins 
 The ANC practice of subcontracting large portions of work to non-
8(a) firms bore extensive criticism from governmental and non-
government critics. A 2009 Senate Subcommittee report suggested that 
no-limit, sole source contracts are sometimes awarded to ANCs for the 
sole purpose of passing the work through to a non-8(a) firm.154 But 
subcontracting is par for the course in completing large government 
contracts.155 The real problem was much more specific. Under the old 
rules, work performance requirements were satisfied through the joint 
venture.156 This allowed non-8(a) joint venture partners to also serve as 
subcontractors, sometimes performing a large majority of work on the 
contract. The more work the joint venture subcontracted, the smaller the 
profits realized by the joint venture. A possible result is the non-8(a) 
partner receiving large sums in subcontractors’ fees, thereby benefitting 
more from the joint venture than the ANC partner.157 
 The 2011 Revisions stipulate that non-8(a) joint venture partners 
and their affiliates can no longer subcontract to 8(a) joint ventures.158 
Instead, any work performed by the non-8(a) partner or its affiliate must 
be completed as a portion of the partner’s 60% maximum contribution to 
contract performance. This ensures that the joint venture partners 
maintain the 40% to 60% work performance ratio required by SBA 
guidelines.159 To protect the 8(a) partner’s profit shares, the new 
regulations also stipulate that the 8(a) partner must receive profits 
commensurate with its work performance or, if incorporated, 
commensurate with its ownership interest (51% or more).160 Prior 
regulations only required that the 8(a) receive 51% of profits.161 As 
discussed above, without clear work performance and ownership 
requirements, unnecessarily high performance costs can easily whittle 
away profits for the 8(a) partner. 
 Regardless of the structure of a partnership, all 8(a) partners to a 
joint venture must submit work performance reports to the SBA. This 
reporting requirement is entirely new to 8(a) joint ventures. The report 
must be submitted annually and at the conclusion of the contract to 
 
 154.  U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 59. 
 155.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 156.  13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (2010). 
 157.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8240. 
 158.  Id. (codified at 13 C.F.R. 124.513(d)(2)(ii)). 
 159.  Id. (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)(2)(ii)(A)). 
 160.  Id. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(4)). 
 161.  13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(3) (2010). 
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explain how the work performance requirement was met.162 By creating 
functional barriers to passing through work to larger firms and 
requiring regular reporting, the SBA guidelines will make business more 
difficult and costly. But the SBA is simultaneously promoting the true 
spirit of the program: business development for disadvantaged 
populations. 
 Stricter regulations could have a variety of effects on firms seeking 
partnerships. One possibility is an increase in partnering among 8(a) 
firms to avoid impropriety in meeting the 40% threshold. Many ANCs 
have already begun partnering among themselves and other socially 
and economically disadvantaged corporations. A classic example is 
Bering Kaya Support Services Joint Venture, a partnership between a 
Bering Straits subsidiary and Kaya Associates, another 8(a) 
disadvantaged small business that often subcontracts for ANCs and 
other 8(a) firms.163 Encouraging cooperation among 8(a) qualifying small 
businesses may lead to disadvantaged firms growing together and 
possibly merging with one another. 
 Clarifying the work performance requirements ensures that 8(a) 
partners will have access to perform substantive work on procured 
contracts. More importantly for ANCs, the revision places the 8(a) 
partner in a position of control. These new specific guidelines fill in the 
gray areas that previously led to substantially reduced profit margins 
for 8(a) joint venture partners. For ANCs, the revisions ensure the ability 
to form joint ventures, attempt complex and sophisticated contracts, and 
subcontract as needed while operating within a system that facilitates 
positive relationships.164 
4.  The “Three in Two” Rule 
 Prior to the 2011 Revisions, the “three in two” rule limited joint 
ventures to submitting three offers to perform government contracts in a 
two-year period.165 The original drafting of this rule failed to identify a 
clear purpose, leading participants to apply their own interpretations of 
the regulatory language. In fact, the original rule could be interpreted to 
 
 162.  8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 
124.513(i)(1)–(2)). 
 163.  Bering Kaya Support Services JV Receives Ft. Greely Contract, AGLUKTUK, 
Jan./Feb. 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://beringstraits.com/northriver/wb/ 
media/agluktuk/2011/2011%20January%20February%20Annual%20Meeting.p
df; see also Company Portfolio, KAYA ASSOCIATES, INC., 
http://www.kayacorp.com/portfolio/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 164.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 165.  13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h) (2010). 
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compel joint ventures to create a new subsidiary and a new joint venture 
each time it makes three bids, even if all three bids were made in a short 
period of time, to remain active in the program. Now, after the 2011 
Revisions, the regulation reads that joint ventures cannot be awarded 
more than three contracts in two years.166 Changing a single word in the 
provision has vast implications for joint ventures. Rather than limiting 
the number of offers a joint venture makes, it limits the number of actual 
contracts procured. Not only does the new language clarify the 
legislative intent, it also expands opportunities for joint ventures. 
 Also, partners within a joint venture can be awarded up to three 
additional contracts in that two-year period by forming additional joint 
ventures. For example, Bering Straits’ aerospace subsidiary (BSA) 
currently partners with a major corporation called LB&B to form the 
BSA-LB&B joint venture. The revisions allow this joint venture to 
procure three 8(a) government contracts over a two-year period. Then, if 
they choose, BSA and LB&B can form another joint venture to double 
the number of contracts awarded over the next two years. 
 But this option is not limitless. The SBA reserves discretion to make 
a “finding of affiliation” if it determines that joint venture partners have 
become contractually dependent on one another due to a longstanding 
relationship.167 As a result, if BSA and LB&B continue to create joint 
ventures together, the SBA reserves the right to deny the joint ventures 
access to government contracts for the remainder of that two-year 
period. The revised procurement limit will serve to counterbalance other 
strict regulations by allowing joint ventures to be considered for more 
contracts. 
 The expounded joint venture regulations described above will 
profoundly impact how ANC joint venture partners perform 8(a) 
contracts in the future. Even the slightest of these revisions, sometimes 
changing only a single word in the regulation, guard 8(a) participants 
from making business decisions based on incorrect interpretations of 
regulatory intent. The commonality of 8(a) certified ANCs entering joint 
ventures makes these revisions all the more important. Armed with 
complete instructions, ANCs can join forces with other corporations 
with clear expectations of the work to be performed and profit margins 
to be earned. 
 
 
 
 166.  13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h) (2012). 
 167.  Id. § 121.103(f); see also 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In the forty years since ANCSA and twenty-five years since the 
SBA opened the 8(a) BD Program to ANC participation, ANCs have 
created thriving businesses to the benefit of Native communities. These 
achievements are nothing less than admirable. But vague regulations 
and lack of enforcement sometimes undermined the goals of Section 
8(a). The SBA attempted to remedy these deficiencies. The results 
consider the form and function of these regulations and make strides 
toward taking a holistic view of Native-owned participant firms, 
including ANCs. 
 The full impact of the 2011 Revisions is still unknown, but some 
changes are certain to cause ANCs to significantly modify their business 
plans.168 The new regulations better articulate program goals and will 
push ANCs to develop viable subsidiaries without the support of the 
8(a) BD program. Allowing 8(a) participants to shift NAICS codes 
balances the increased oversight of size regulations and prevents 
Native-owned businesses from continuously rotating subsidiaries 
within an industry. ANCs can expect positive gains from this change. 
For example, in 2010 an ANC called Koniag, Inc. attributed 71% of 
revenues to services for the federal government but also saw revenues 
increase by 29% due to subsidiary diversification. This considerable 
growth in a single fiscal year is mostly attributable to entering new 
markets.169 
 The creation of joint venture partnerships will become increasingly 
competitive in coming years. Stricter rules place ANC joint venture 
partners in control of contract performance and provide recourse for 
mentor firm violations. As a result, ANCs will likely be more selective in 
choosing their non-8(a) partners, an approach that will translate to non-
8(a) firms seeking to partner with 8(a) firms. Rather than relying on an 
ANC merely to obtain access to 8(a) contracts, potential partners will 
consider the ANC’s ability to take on a given contract, manage the 
project, and complete its mandated portion of the work. Over time, 
mentors with an improper view of program benefits may be effectively 
phased out. 
 Moreover, joint ventures between 8(a) firm subsidiaries are a viable 
option, offering both partners full access to 8(a) contracts without the 
concern of regulations aimed at non-8(a) partner firms. This 
arrangement is not unheard of. In 2000, ASRC and Chenega Technology 
 
 168.  Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
 169.  Stricker, supra note 46, at 78–79. 
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Services formed NJVC to offer IT services to the Department of 
Defense.170 Calista’s Yulista Management and Sealaska’s SES, now both 
8(a) BD Program graduates, together formed the joint venture JVYS.171 In 
2010, Sealaska went so far as to acquire a former Hispanic-owned 8(a) 
partner called Security Alliance of Florida.172 It is foreseeable that this 
trend will expand under the revised regulations, promoting competition 
among ANCs to form the most practical partnerships with other 
qualifying firms. 
 All government contractors, both 8(a) and otherwise, will feel the 
pinch of decreased government spending following these and other 
regulatory revisions. Chugach Alaska Corporation (Chugach), with 64% 
of revenues in government contracts, cited changes in government 
contract procurement policies as a reason for contract losses and 
decreased revenues from $1.1 billion in 2009 to $937 million in 2010.173 
But budgetary changes and SBA regulatory revisions are applicable to 
all government contractors. For this reason, ANCs might experience 
lower revenues in the coming years, but they will not be any more 
vulnerable to lost profits than other government contractors. 
 ANCs may be on equal footing with other 8(a) firms under the 
finalized rule changes, but politics may play a large role as well. 
Government contracting by Native-owned firms experienced a special 
brand of negative attention during the revision process. The Native-
owned government contracting community worries that heightened 
oversight and negative political attention may deter government 
contracting officers from awarding contracts to Native-owned 
businesses in the future. It remains to be seen to what extent these and 
other regulatory revisions will change political attitudes and how those 
changes will effect ANC contract procurement in the future.174 
 
 170.  About Us, NJVC, http://www.njvc.com/about-us (last visited Feb. 19, 
2012). 
 171.  JOINT VENTURE YULISTA & SES, http://www.jvys.org (last visited Feb. 19, 
2012). 
 172.  Stricker, supra note 46, at 81. 
 173.  Id. at 77. 
 174.  This Article focuses on ANC participation in the 8(a) BD program, but 
the FY10 Section 8(11) National Defense Regulation changes are suspected to 
have an equal or greater impact on Native-owned firms. In short, 8(a) firms are 
no longer exempt from the justification and approval process for defense 
contracts valued over $20 million. ANCs comprise most of the few 8(a) firms 
with the ability to perform contracts of this size. Some ANCs fear that the 
negative political attention leading to the 8(a) and 8(11) changes will cause 
contracting officers to avoid awarding contracts to Native-owned firms in the 
future. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66. 
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 Regulatory changes, budget cuts, and increased scrutiny of 
government spending will cause the next two to five years to be difficult 
while government contractors learn to operate within this new 
paradigm.175 But the introduction of healthy competition and the push 
to develop beyond 8(a) will spur ANC subsidiaries to grow faster and 
eventually compete without government intervention. As ANCs rise to 
the challenge, so will profits. Eventually, ANC subsidiaries will outgrow 
the 8(a) BD Program with the confidence and capital to compete in the 
greater market. 
 
 
 175.  Id. 
